Pruning the Political Tree
For two years, Xi's anti-corruption campaign has targeted party officials accused of moral and/or material corruption. Xi has wielded the rule of law-in this case the Party's internal disciplinary rules-like a blade with which to prune the unruly branches at the top of the political tree.
These 'branches' include mid-ranking party officials as well as higherups in Beijing whom he considers a potential threat to his leadership; not all the corrupt officials are targeted. Still, with at least one senior official in every province under arrest, this campaign has turned into the most comprehensive attack on graft since the Cultural Revolution.
In 2015, its focus turned to the business sector, including some of China's biggest corporations: CNP, Sinopec, and Chinalco. The Washingtonbased Eurasia Group, the world's largest consultancy specialising in political risk, suggests that in 2015, no less than eighty-three Chinese entities-including state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and institutions such as the China Securities Regulatory Commission-have fallen under investigation, compared with twenty in 2013 when the campaign began. 
Criminalising Unruliness
The 2015 Amendment to the 1997 Criminal Law, passed in August, listed nine types of crimes that will no longer be subject to the death penalty.
Smuggling weapons or ammunition, smuggling nuclear materials, smuggling counterfeit money, counterfeiting, investment fraud and fraudulent The Criminal Law has introduced twenty new criminal offences and the amendment has increased the seriousness of selected other offences.
Among the newly listed crimes are contempt of court as evidenced by 'insulting a judge', 'disrupting court orders', 'reporting or revealing information about cases not made public', and even bringing a civil case that is based on 'a distorted version of the truth'. In addition, the law targets forms of dissent including 'fabricating or deliberately transmitting false information' online, 'forcing someone to wear extremist clothing or tokens', 'disrupting the work of public bodies', and 'organising or aiding illegal gatherings.' The new crime of 'forcing someone to wear extremist clothing or tokens' appears to be aimed at discouraging Uyghur men and women in Xinjiang from wearing clothing such as the hijab, or Muslim headscarf that expresses devotion to their faith. 
THE NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & THE COUNTERTERRORISM LAW, by Oma Lee
The National People's Congress approved new National Security and Counterterrorism laws.
Foreign media, technology companies, foreign civil society organisations, and governments have widely criticised the laws for conferring Chinese authorities with even greater powers to restrict and control the activities of non-state actors especially when coupled with the Law on Managing Foreign Non-Governmental Organisations and Cybersecurity Laws.
The National Security Law effectively grants the National Security Commission domain over China's national security encompassing politics, the military, finance, cyberspace, culture, environment, ideology, and religion. It sets out the principles of security management, including intelligence collection, risk assessments, national security reviews, emergency responses, and so on, and lays out the responsibilities of citizens and companies to assist the authorities in protecting national security and reporting potential threats. This applies to Hong Kong and Macau as well.
The law also requires Internet and information technology, information systems and data to be 'secure and controllable'. The National Security Commission has the power to conduct reviews of foreign commercial investment, special technologies, Internet information technology products and services, and all other projects involving national security matters (Article 59). A broad spectrum of foreign governments, businesses, and civil society groups see the law as legitimising stronger restrictions on foreign business, social and political interests in China.
The Counterterrorism Law, meanwhile, proposes the establishment of a national body in charge of identifying terrorist activities and co-ordinating nationwide counterterrorist work. The first draft, issued for public comment in November 2014, drew widespread criticism for its vague definition of terrorism and the requirement that foreign tech companies provide their encryption keys to authorities and keep their servers and user data in China. Foreign companies and leaders, including US President Obama criticised the law and its potential effect on the Chinese business environment, making it less attractive to foreign companies. China has argued that many Western governments have similar requirements and that Chinese companies operating overseas are subjected to heavy security checks. Still, the final draft removed, inter alia, the clauses about encryption keys and foreign businesses keeping servers and user data in China.
The law still requires companies to provide encryption information upon the request of the government. Telecommunications and Internet service providers in particular are also required to monitor, report, and prevent dissemination of information on terrorism and extremism (including activities, such as peaceful agitation for greater autonomy for Xinjiang or Tibet, that are not considered either terrorist or extremist outside China).
(Article 19).
The Chinese government has claimed that the laws will help strengthen the Partystate's ability to prevent, handle, and punish threats to both national and international security. How it will affect foreign business activities and data security in practice remains to be seen. is most significant about the new law is that it shifts the focus from punishment to prevention in such a way that justifies even more pervasive surveillance, particularly over people's expressed opinions on the basis of safeguarding the country's 'core interests' 核心 利益. As defined in Article 2 of the new law, these are: maintenance of the political system under the rule of the Communist Party, the defence of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and economic development.
In its preamble, the law states baldly that safeguarding the political regime ranks above sovereignty, national unification, territorial integrity, and the people's welfare. The implication is that any activities alleged to endanger the rule of the Communist Party may now be interpreted as a threat to national security. Vague wording makes it easier for the party-state to act against its internal and external 'enemies' on issues ranging from cultural and ideological heterodoxy to cybersecurity and even China's interests in space. and leaving itself open to the accusation that China has political prisoners, finds some dubious crime to pin on the accused, one that may be difficult to defend and which has the additional benefit of smearing their public reputation. In September, just ahead of Xi's visit to the US, Guo and He were released on bail, a gesture seen by many observers as a way of smoothing Xi's path in the US by pre-empting complaints about human rights violations. 
Pruning Other Parts of the Tree

FEMINIST FIVE, by Siodhbhra Parkin
As discussed in this chapter, the Feminist Five 女权五姐妹-Li Tingting 李婷婷, Wu Rongong 武嵘嵘, Zheng Churan 郑楚然, Wei Tingting 韦婷婷, and Wang Man 王曼-were arrested in the middle of the night on 6 March 2015, two days before International Women's Day. The arrests took place on the eve of the Five's planned public campaign to raise awareness about sexual harassment on public transportation; they were charged with 'gathering a crowd to disrupt public order' despite not having had the chance to gather the crowd in the first place.
Previously Li Tingting and others had organised a movement called 'Occupy Men's Toilets' that involved staging sit-ins at male toilets to draw attention to the relative lack of facilities for women. 'Occupy' attracted widespread international and domestic media attention. Another one of the women, Wu Rongrong had founded Weizhiming 蔚之鸣, a legal centre specialising in women's rights, and often organised public education events. Both Li Tingting and Wei Tingting have also played extremely public roles in LGBT rights activism.
The Feminist Five were released on bail within twenty-four hours of each other on 13 April 2015. They had spent thirty-seven days at the Haidian District Detention Centre. All five are still officially criminal suspects, though no court dates have been set. Some of them have already been briefly re-detained and questioned. They also face travel restrictions, and are prohibited from speaking to the media. Weizhiming, the women's legal centre, was forced to shut its doors in the summer of 2015, followed by the closure of the internationally During July and August, public security officers took into custody more than 250 lawyers and professional legal staff, interrogating them about both their own activities and those of their colleagues. A number of lawyers were kept in police custody for extended periods; others were placed under 'residential surveillance at a fixed location' 指定居所监 视 without access to their own lawyers. While some were released within days or months according to the terms of the law, others have been charged with the crime of 'picking quarrels and provoking troubles' 寻衅 滋事罪 or 'endangering state security' 危害国家安全罪.
To support the campaign, Chinese official media published articles outlining the threats that such lawyers allegedly posed to social stability.
In the weeks leading up to and following the crackdown, the People's Daily described human rights lawyers as a dangerous criminal 'gang' 圈子 that has been undermining the social order since 2012. The articles resurrect Maoist tactics of public shaming to justify repression against alleged dissenters. As of 11 December 2015, twenty-five lawyers and their associates remained under 'residential surveillance at a fixed location', the majority held in unknown locations without the ability to access either legal advice or make contact with their families. Police also harassed the lawyers' families and peers. They repeatedly interrogated Wang Yu's sixteen-year-old son and confiscated his passport.
In October, the boy crossed the border into Myanmar, but was arrested there and taken back to China, where he was put under house arrest. They sentenced Pu, who had already been detained for eighteen months, to a three-years 'suspended' 缓刑 jail sentence, which he will most probably spend outside jail, and suspended his licence to practice law. 
Conclusion
Developments in 2015 make it difficult to argue that there has been a shift to a rule of law, at least as understood in countries such as Australia or the US. Mao's legacy is clearly visible in the party-state's approach to the administration of justice and criminal punishment under Xi Jinping, particularly in the politico-legal language it is using, with its references to struggles, wars, and social contradictions. On the other hand, Xi is using Party-Rule-Through-Law to impose a clear political agenda on both the Party machinery and criminal justice agencies. Both internal Party regulations and criminal laws place a priority on protecting the state and preserving political stability (i.e. the continued rule of the Communist Party). They aim to thwart corruption, improve the efficiency of government, and enhance judicial fairness-but also to suppress dissent, even when it is in the form of arguing for the rights of citizens under China's own laws and constitution. As a result, Xi's years in power will almost surely be remembered far more for his intolerance of discordant voices than for any rule of law. 
